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The Racial Antecedents to Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: How Congress
Judged the Judges from Brown to
Booker
Naomi Murakawa*
On January 12, 2005, the Supreme Court held in United
States v. Booker that Federal Sentencing Guidelines violate the
Sixth Amendment jury-trial right, and thereafter judges must
only consider the Guidelines as advisory.' Booker therefore ended
the eighteen-year era of mandatory Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, in which judges were required to "plot" convicted
criminals along an official Guideline table and then assign a
sentence as specified in the appropriate "cell." The Supreme
Court's gutting of legislatively-authorized mandatory sentencing
guidelines - seen first in Blakely's 2004 holding against the
constitutionality of Washington State's Sentencing Guidelines 2
and then in Booker's 2005 holding against Federal Sentencing
* Assistant Professor, Political Science, University of Washington;
Ph.D., Political Science, Yale University (2005); M.Sc., Social Policy, London
School of Economics (1997); B.A. summa cum laude, Women's and Gender
Studies, Columbia University (1996). Professor Murakawa is currently
completing a book manuscript on the motivations and mechanisms driving
America's racially distinctive punishment regime.
1. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226-27 (2005).
2. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305 (2004).
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Guidelines 3 - has prompted frenzied debates about the future of
criminal sentencing. Former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor called Blakely a "No. 10 earthquake," 4 political scientist
Frank 0. Bowman III characterized Blakely as a "train wreck,"5
and the legal scholar Douglas A. Berman called Blakely and
Booker "blockbuster rulings" that may be "the most consequential
and important criminal justice decision [s] not just in recent terms,
not just of the Rehnquist Court, but perhaps in the history of the
Supreme Court."6 In contrast, Representative Maxine Waters (D-
California) categorized Booker as "not a big issue." For
Representative Waters, a member of the Congressional Black
Caucus and the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and
Homeland Security, Booker was "not the major issue," especially
for "those of us who understand what racism and discrimination
are all about."7
With Booker alternately described as an earthquake, a train
wreck, and not a big deal, this article considers the Supreme
Court's ending to mandatory Sentencing Guidelines by
reconsidering Congress's initiation of mandatory Sentencing
Guidelines. Congress mandated the creation of Sentencing
Guidelines with the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,8 but this
article argues that members of Congress set the agenda for
censuring judges at least three decades earlier. In the mid-1950s,
3. Booker, 543 U.S. at 226-27.
4. Erik Luna, Gridland: An Allegorical Critique of Federal Sentencing,
96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 25, 54 (2005). Douglas A. Berman also
characterizes Blakely as a legal earthquake shaking the foundation of
structured sentencing reform. Go Slow: A Recommendation for Responding to
Blakely v. Washington in the Federal System Before the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary (July 13, 2004) (written testimony of Douglas A. Berman).
5. Frank 0. Bowman, III, Train Wreck? Or Can the Federal Sentencing
System Be Saved? A Plea for Rapid Reversal of Blakely v. Washington, 41 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 217, 217 (2004).
6. Douglas A. Berman, Punishment and Crime: Reconceptualizing
Sentencing, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 41 (2005).
7. Implications of the Booker/Fanfan Decisions for the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines Before the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 54 (2005).
[hereinafter Implications of the Booker/Fanfan Decisions] Representative
Waters argues that the controversy around Booker is ultimately far less
important than mandatory minimum statutes and their disproportionate
impact on African Americans.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) (2000).
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southern Democrats and Republicans launched politically
prominent attacks on judges, denouncing judges as activist,
tyrannical, elitist, out of touch with American values, and
sympathetic to subversive groups. Indeed, since the Supreme
Court's 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education,9 national
leaders have exploited the political profitability of judging judges.
In 1954, southern Democrats and Republicans denounced judicial
lenience in terms of lenience in loosening the racial order of Jim
Crow; in 1984, that same demographic of members of Congress
denounced judicial lenience in terms of lenience in criminal
sentencing. In short, political resistance to judicial discretion in
Brown shaped the agenda, rhetoric, and coalition of Congress's
subsequent attacks on judicial discretion in criminal sentencing.
This article identifies the racial antecedents to Sentencing
Guidelines over two sections. Section I situates Sentencing
Guidelines within the broader sentencing revolution, and
questions the standard account of what sparked the sentencing
revolution. It has become almost conventional wisdom that
Sentencing Guidelines were borne of a transformation of ideals, in
which judicial discretion collapsed with the collapse of the
rehabilitative ideal. In contrast, this section argues that
Sentencing Guidelines were part of larger Congressional attacks
on judges, and, moreover, Congressional attacks on judicial
discretion were borne of political profitability linked to racial
anxiety, not just disrupted ideals.
Section II reconsiders how Congress passed the Sentencing
Reform Act. Rather than offering a traditional legislative history,
this section identifies how pivotal members of Congress
constructed and attacked the racially liberal judge. The two
central conservative supporters of sentencing reform, Senators
John McClellan and Strom Thurmond, attacked racial
liberalization after Brown to the tune of three anti-judge themes:
judges abuse power, judges wrongly employ sociological reasoning,
and judges underestimate the need for stern discipline with
blacks. Like other southern Democrats and Republicans, Senators
McClellan and Thurmond echoed these themes in supporting
sentencing reform and punitive crime policy. In simple terms, the
political roots of the revolution in criminal sentencing can be
9. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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found in neither crime nor sentencing; rather, the antecedents to
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are found in the longstanding
legacy of attacking racially liberal judges. The arc of
Congressional politics from Brown to Booker therefore underscores
the necessity of following Representative Waters's directive: to
understand sentencing reform, we must "understand what racism
and discrimination are all about."1o
I. THE SENTENCING REVOLUTION AS A REVOLUTION OF IDEALS?
From the nation's founding through the first three-quarters of
the twentieth century, Congress and state legislatures rarely
interfered with judicial control over criminal sentencing. With
limited legislative oversight, judges decided the nature and length
of punishment, constrained only by statutory maximum sentences
and a handful of mandatory minimum sentences. Parole boards
similarly held broad discretion in determining ultimate release
dates, with prisoners usually eligible for release after serving one-
third of the maximum sentence. 1 This section examines why
Congress and state legislatures began hamstringing judicial
discretion after such a long tradition of legislative laissez-faire.
Scholars of Sentencing Guidelines often explain the
sentencing revolution as a revolution sparked by disrupted ideals.
The important scholarship of Douglas A. Berman highlights how
the sentencing revolution suffers from conceptual
underdevelopment, and why he therefore seeks to "bring greater
conceptual order to a field that now seems so disorderly." 12
Berman suggests that sentencing during the era of vast judicial
discretion held philosophical coherence because it was "formally
and fully conceptualized around the 'rehabilitative ideal. '" 13
Under this ideal, trial judges and parole officials held broad
discretion "to allow sentences to be tailored to the rehabilitation
prospects and progress of each individual offender." 4 Kate Stith
and Jose A. Cabranes similarly argue that the longstanding
tradition of sentencing flexibility reposes on the rehabilitative
ideal, complicated by some uncertainty of the purposes of
10. Implications of the Booker/Fanfan Decisions, supra note 7.
11. MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 4-6 (1996).
12. Berman, supra note 6, at 2.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 3.
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sentencing. 15 In these accounts, the rehabilitative ideal cemented
the protocol of broad judicial discretion. And consequently,
judicial discretion went adrift with the decay of the rehabilitative
ideal. The sentencing revolution is therefore a "conceptual anti-
movement," premised on the repudiation of rehabilitation and the
elimination of sentencing disparities.'6
Portrayed as a battle of ideas, the declining rehabilitative
ideal of the 1970s is attributed to new research from experts and
new statements from judges. Scholarship mattered. In 1974,
Robert Martinson surveyed 231 studies of penal rehabilitation
from 1945 to 1967 and found discouraging results. 17 Martinson's
study was widely cited with the cynical synopsis "nothing works."
In 1975, James Q. Wilson criticized the rehabilitative model as a
symptom of failed social liberalism and lenience, and he therefore
proposed fixed-term punishments.18 In 1976, two major reports
both proposed the end of indeterminate sentencing laws,
restrictions on parole, and fixed-term sanctions geared to the
offense and not the offender.' 9 Scholars of sentencing reform cite
this scholarship as centrally important to the declining
rehabilitative ideal of the 1970s. 20
Alongside scholars, judges were also pivotal in the ideational
15. KATE STITH & Jose A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING
GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 14 (1998). Stith and Cabranes offer a
deep genealogy of ideals by tracing the 1970s impulse for certainty and
uniformity to Enlightenment ideals. One of the most prominent
Enlightenment thinkers on punishment, Cesare Beccaria, argued that
deterrence was best served by legislatures proscribing each offense and its
corresponding penalty. In this impressive lineage of ideals, Stith and
Cabranes show that "like Beccaria in the eighteenth century, the federal
Sentencing Guidelines today seek to replace the discretionary power of judges
with an elaborate, less intuitive, and more scientific system for the
elaboration of penal sanctions." Id. at 11-13.
16. Berman, supra note 6, at 10-11.
17. Robert Martinson, What Works? - Questions and Answers About
Prison Reform, 35 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 22, 24-25, 48 (1974).
18. See JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 170-71 (1975).
19. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS -
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF INCARCERATION (1976);
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT
(1976).
20. For example, Douglas Berman highlights most of the above scholars
as central to the declining rehabilitative ideal. Berman, supra note 6, at 8.
Michael Tonry also identifies these scholars as central to the end of broad
judicial discretion. TONRY, supra note 11, at 9.
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move away from discretionary rehabilitation. In his 1973 book,
Judge Marvin E. Frankel proposed limiting judicial discretion to
end "justice without law."21 After fifteen years as a U.S. District
Judge, Frankel rejected unfettered judicial discretion as
antithetical to the rule of law, and proposed the creation of an
administrative "Commission on Sentencing" that would enact
"binding guides" on courts. 22 Senator Edward M. Kennedy, the
chief sponsor of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, called Frankel
"the father of sentencing reform," and scholars of sentencing
reform echo the expression as a measure of how ideas mattered. 23
In short, the commonplace and commonsense explanation for
the sentencing revolution suggests the following causal chain.
Scholars and judges razed the rehabilitative ideal through the
1970s. Senator Edward Kennedy's subsequent sustained
campaign for sentencing reform, initiated in 1975, put sentencing
on the congressional agenda. Therefore the initial transformation
of ideals caused congressional intervention.
Though intuitive, the ideals-centered account has several
problems. The sociologist David Garland proffers a compelling
three-point critique. First, research contesting the viability and
value of rehabilitation has been widespread since the 1930s, and
therefore research of the 1970s carries no unique transformative
power. Second, research findings in the mid-1970s offered no
definitive pronouncements of the failure of rehabilitation. Even
though Martinson's study incurred the summary "nothing works,"
the study actually shows that some things do work, and Martinson
later reformulated his claims to offer a far more optimistic account
of rehabilitation. 24 Third, challenges to the rehabilitative ideal
could have been met with reasonable defenses, such as the claim
that rehabilitation programs are under-funded, under-staffed, and
undermined by the punitive context of prison.25 In the vast battle
of ideals, Garland makes a compelling case that critiques of
21. MARVIN FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 122
(1973).
22. Id. at 122, 123.
23. See, e.g., STITH AND CABRANES, supra note 15, at 35-36; Berman,
supra note 6, at 9; TONRY, supra note 11, at 9-10, 12-13, 24-26.
24. Robert Martsinson, New Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution
Regarding Sentencing Reform, 7 HOFsTRA L. REV. 243 (1979).
25. DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER
IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 63, 65 (2001).
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rehabilitation were neither new, nor unequivocal, nor irrefutable
in the 1970s.
More fundamentally, it was Congress and state legislatures,
not disembodied ideals, that ultimately promulgated the
sentencing revolution. Critiques of the rehabilitative ideal were
not new to the 1970s, but massive legislative activism in
curtailing judicial discretion was. In the last third of the
twentieth century, legislatures undercut judicial discretion with
unprecedented passage of mandatory minimums, three-strikes,
and sentencing guidelines. During this period, Congress and all
state legislatures passed new mandatory minimums, in which the
legislative statute rather than the trial judge sets the minimum
sentence length. Most state legislatures have passed mandatory
minimums for repeat offenders (40 states), for crimes committed
using a deadly weapon (38 states and the District of Columbia),
for drug possession or trafficking (36 states and the District of
Columbia), and for drunk driving (31 states).26 Congress has
passed mandatory minimum statutes for all of these offenses and
then some. Three-strikes laws are a similarly popular legislative
constraint on judicial discretion. Washington enacted the first
three-strikes law in 1993, Congress followed suit in 1994, and
another 23 states had adopted two- and three-strikes laws by
1996.27 With sentencing guidelines, legislatures charge an extra-
26. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, 1996 NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE
SENTENCING STRUCTURES 17 (1998) [hereinafter 1996 Survey].
27. Id. Alongside contraction of judicial discretion, legislatures have
curbed administrative discretion by eliminating parole boards and limiting
parole discretion through truth-in-sentencing statutes. PAULA M. DITrON &
DORIA JAMES WILSON, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS: TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 3 (Jan. 1999) [hereinafter
TRUTH IN SENTENCING]. Since the turn of the century, parole boards have
exercised final authority in deciding when to release a prisoner. Twelve
states have eliminated discretionary parole, beginning with Maine in 1975.
Id. at 3. In 1984, Congress abolished the U.S. Parole Commission, which had
been entrusted to release selected inmates from federal prisons since 1910.
Id.; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §1A1.1 (2004). Moreover, Congress
has effectively encouraged states to reduce the discretionary power of parole
boards through financial incentives for truth-in-sentencing statutes. TRUTH
IN SENTENCING, at 1. Truth-in-sentencing refers to sentencing practices that
reduce the uncertainty about the length of time that offenders will serve in
prison. In 1994, Congress offered financial incentives for states to establish
truth-in-sentencing, set at a benchmark of eighty-five percent time-served for
violent offenders. Id. Prior to 1994, only five states had truth-in-sentencing
2006]
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judicial body with creating uniform sentencing standards for
judges to follow. Seventeen states have created sentencing
guidelines, beginning with Utah in 1979.
Spearheaded by re-election-seeking legislators, the sentencing
revolution manifests the political profitability of attacking judges
as much as it manifests incentive-free ideals. The remainder of
this article therefore moves toward a political account of the
sentencing revolution by examining the political antecedents of
how Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. Why did
members of Congress begin judging the judges so harshly? How
did members of Congress characterize the problem of judicial
discretion? When did such major Congressional attacks on judicial
discretion gain political momentum? The next section addresses
these questions.
II. THE SENTENCING REVOLUTION AS A
REVOLUTION OF RACIAL POLITICS
With the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Congress created
the U.S. Sentencing Commission and charged it with developing
Sentencing Guidelines for all federal offenders. This section
identifies how and why members of Congress came to advocate
Sentencing Guidelines, even when doing so meant breaking the
near two-century tradition of entrusting judges with broad
sentencing discretion. My central claim is that Congressional
support for Sentencing Guidelines was indeed borne of discontent
with judges, but that this discontent was not limited to the policy
arena of criminal sentencing. Instead, members of Congress,
particularly southern Democrats and Republicans, launched
salient attacks against judges after judges began loosening the
legal order of Jim Crow. Where legal scholars make impressive
connections to find underlying conceptual clarity in sentencing
reform, my account identifies disconnected and tortured logic at
the core of Congressional support for Sentencing Guidelines. In
the last half of the twentieth century, the history of Congress's
attack on judges is built on this critical disjuncture: in the mid-
1950s, judicial discretion on racial desegregation ignited attacks
statutes; after Congress, in 1994, established financial incentives, an
additional fourteen states passed truth-in-sentencing statutes set at the
eighty-five percent time-served benchmark. Id.
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on judges as liberal, lenient, elitist, susceptible to psychological
and sociological claims, and detached from the values of ordinary
Americans; in the mid-1980s, judicial discretion on criminal
sentencing incurred the same political attacks on judges set in
motion three decades earlier. The target - judges - remained
stable, while the issue slipped from lenience in Jim Crow to
lenience in criminal sentencing.
A. The Racial Roots of Attacking Judges
Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 by
bringing together an odd coalition with divergent interests in
sentencing reform. Sentencing reform's chief advocate, the liberal
Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Massachusetts), forged key
partnerships with the southern conservative Senators John
McClellan (D-Arkansas) and Senator Strom Thurmond (R-South
Carolina). 28 Sentencing reform gained momentum in 1975, when
Senator Kennedy hosted a dinner for Judge Frankel and
subsequently introduced a bill to form a U.S. Commission on
Sentencing to issue sentencing guidelines.29  In subsequent
legislation, Senator Kennedy worked closely with his conservative
allies. In 1977, Senators Kennedy and McClellan introduced a
similar bill, which passed in the Senate but died after a
subcommittee hearing in the House.30 In 1980, Senators Kennedy
and Thurmond, joined by Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah),
introduced a bill that retained the proposal to establish a
sentencing commission and added an additional measure to
abolish parole; neither chamber acted on the bill.31 In 1983 and
1984, Senators Kennedy and Thurmond worked together on the
bill that finally passed both houses, the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984, which included the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 in its second section. 32 President Ronald Reagan signed the
28. STITH AND CABRANES, supra note 15, at 39. Stith and Cabranes argue
that Kennedy was the central advocate of sentencing reform, and he enlisted
the support of McClellan and Thurmond as key critical conservative
advocates.
29. S. 2699, 94th Cong. The National Commission on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws recommended the classification and grading of offenses in
1971, but bills in the 92nd and 93rd Congress won little support.
30. S. 1437, 95th Cong. (1977).
31. S. 1722, 96th Cong. (1979)
32. S. 1762, 98th Cong. (1983). U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN YEARS
20061
482 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol. 11:473
bill into law on October 12, 1984.33
Typical of the liberal and northern Democrats who supported
sentencing reform, Senator Kennedy's decade-long campaign
emphasized the need for rationality and racial fairness in
sentencing. Senator Kennedy consistently criticized federal
sentencing as "hopelessly inconsistent," "arbitrary," and
"desperately" in need of reform. 34 Senator Kennedy characterized
his 1984 bill as "revis[ing] Federal sentencing procedures to
achieve a rationality, uniformity, and fairness that does [sic] not
exist in the current system."35  To evidence his claims of
inconsistency, Senator Kennedy cited the famous 1974 study of
fifty Federal Second Circuit judges who, when given twenty
identical files based on actual cases, imposed wildly different
sentences. In one extortion case, for example, judges assigned
sentences ranging from three years imprisonment to twenty years
imprisonment plus a $65,000 fine. 36 In line with ideals-centered
explanations, it appears that Judge Marvin Frankel persuaded
Senator Kennedy to recalibrate policy to new ideas.
For many conservative supporters of Sentencing Guidelines,
however, the political history of mistrusting judges goes far
deeper. Consider the lineage of attacking judges as it developed
over the long careers of sentencing reform's two key conservative
supporters, Senators McClellan and Thurmond. Senators
McClellan and Thurmond launched sustained criticism of judges
after the Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of
Education. Historically, it is nothing new for members of Congress
and other national leaders to target judges as objects of praise or
censure, and national political campaigns centralized the Supreme
Court as an object of political controversy in 1860, 1896, 1924, and
1936. 37 On May 17, 1954, when the Supreme Court issued its
OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN ASSESSMENT OF How WELL THE FEDERAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM 5
(Nov. 2004), available at http'//www.ussc.gov/15-year/15year.htm.
33. STITH AND CABRANES, supra note 15, at 38.
34. Id.
35. 130 CONG. REC. 1644 (1984).
36. 130 CONG. REC. 1644 (1984). See ANTHONY PARTRIDGE AND WILLIAM
B. ELDRIDGE, THE SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY: A REPORT TO JUDGES 1-
3, 9 (1974).
37. See generally Walter F. Murphy and Joseph Tanenhaus, Public
Opinion and the Supreme Court: The Goldwater Campaign, 32 PUB. OPIN.
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decision in Brown, the next wave of politically prominent judge-
bashing began.38 In Brown, the Supreme Court unanimously held
that the "separate but equal" standard of Plessy v. Ferguson39 was
no longer acceptable, and racial segregation in public schools was
therefore unconstitutional. 40 The day of the Brown decision,
known to segregationists as "Black Monday," ignited disdain of
the Warren Court amongst southern Democrats. Epitomizing the
south's reaction was Senator Harry Byrd's (D-Virginia) reference
to Earl Warren as "the modern Thaddeus Stevens, now cloaked in
the robes of the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme
Court."41  Southern Democrats even drafted the Southern
Manifesto of 1956, a joint resolution signed by 101 members of
Congress from eleven southern states, which claimed that the
Court's "exercise of naked power" had supplanted "personal,
political, and social ideas for the established law of the land."42
Like their southern colleagues, Senators McClellan and
Thurmond expressed their anger over a changing racial order as
contempt for judges. Their criticisms hit three particular themes:
first, judges abuse their power; second, judges allow sociological
evidence to trump legal precedent; and third, judges ignore Jim
Crow's vital role in minimizing crime and maintaining a safe
social order. Floor statements illustrate that McClellan and
Thurmond criticized the racial liberalism of judges through these
three themes.
The first post-Brown theme is that judges abuse their power.
After the Supreme Court rejected "separate but equal," Senators
McClellan and Thurmond accused the Supreme Court of
extending its power over states' rights and over Congressional
intent. Senator McClellan called Brown an "infamous decision" in
which the Supreme Court made it "the public policy of the United
States to undermine the traditional state and local control of
public education."43  Senator Thurmond argued that Brown
violated Congress's intent behind the 14th Amendment, because
QUART. 31 (1968).
38. CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, THE WARREN COURT & ITS CRITICS 10 (1968).
39. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
40. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95.
41. LYTLE, supra note 38, at 6.
42. Id. at 12.
43. 110 CONG. REC. 7872 (1964).
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"the 39th Congress, which in 1866 framed the 14th Amendment to
the Constitution... also provided for the operation of segregated
schools in the District of Columbia." Senator Thurmond concluded
that "this is positive evidence that the Congress did not intend to
prohibit segregation by the 14th Amendment."44
In this view, the judges had subsumed the traditional powers
of states and Congress only to become a tyrant for black rights.
Senator Thurmond interpreted Brown as the Supreme Court's
choice between two diametrically opposed forces: on one side was
the Constitution, and on the other side were civil rights
"propagandists" who sidestepped legislative intent and forced
people to "bow meekly to the decree of the Supreme Court."45
Senator Thurmond stated that "while we are thinking of tyranny
in Hungary, I wish to take a few minutes to discuss tyranny in the
United States; and when I say that, I mean the tyranny of the
judiciary in the United States."46 In his opposition to the Civil
Rights Bill of 1960, Senator Thurmond characterized Brown as an
"underhanded blow" and a "dastardly undercutting of
constitutional fabric" that had prompted "widespread and high
placed" public criticism of judges.47 The proper role of the judge,
in Senator Thurmond's account, is to interpret the Constitution
based on "thought at the time of its adoption, without so much as
a glance at 'current conditions.' 48 What case exemplifies sound
judicial interpretation? According to Senator Thurmond, Dred
Scott v. Sandford49 well represents the modest judicial reasoning
of examining original intent rather than current conditions.
Perhaps it was a perk for Senator Thurmond that Dred Scott also
held that blacks are not citizens. 50
44. 102 CONG. REC. 4461 (1956).
45. Id.
46. 103 CONG. REC. 10333 (1957) (emphasis added).
47. 106 CONG. REC. 7620, 7622 (1960).
48. Id. at 7621.
49. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
50. Senator Thurmond quoted the syllabus of the Dred Scott opinion as
an example of proper original intent jurisprudence. The syllabus (notably not
a part of the majority opinion) in Dred Scott stated, "The change in public
opinion and feeling in relation to the African race, which has taken place
since the adoption of the Constitution, cannot change its construction and
meaning, and it must be construed and administered now according to its
true meaning and intention when it was formed and adopted." Id. (quoting
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 393).
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The second post-Brown theme is that judges rely on evidence
from sociologists and psychologists, and therein judges have
abandoned narrow legal reasoning for the expansive reasoning of
social well-being. The Brown decision cited social science research
such as Gunnar Myrdal's An American Dilemma and Kenneth
Clark's doll studies, in which black children expressed preferences
for white dolls over black dolls.5 1 Senator Thurmond declared that
"what the courts have done was without color of law under the
Constitution. Instead the decisions hinged on the testimony of
sociologists and psychologists."52 By considering the consequences
of segregation in psychological and sociological terms, judges made
themselves arbiters of social status.
The third post-Brown theme is that racial liberalization itself
- in the form of judicial holdings, legislative acts, and social
protests - generates more crime. Judges are centrally but not
exclusively indicted in this claim. Senator McClellan argued that
forced race-mixing invites crime, and even civil rights legislation
creating a Federal Employment Protection Commission would
incite crime. 53 In opposing the "evil legislation" of the Civil Rights
Bill of 1964, Senator McClellan suggested that the bill "illegally -
unconstitutionally - deprives American citizens of their
fundamental right to be free from governmental coercion with
respect to the unhampered use and enjoyment of the fruits of their
labor, or the selection of their employees, and in the choice of their
associates."54 Illegal coercion and race-mixing means "serious
crime will greatly increase rather than diminish following the
passage of this measure."55 Senator Thurmond also held that
51. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. at 495 n.11. Southern Democrats
like Senator James Eastland (D-Miss.) chastised the Court for basing its
opinions on the teachings of a "Swedish Carbetbagger" like Gunnar Myrdal.
LYTLE, supra note 38, at 22.
52. 101 CONG. REC. 1064 (1955).
53. 95 CONG. REC. 2086 (1949). McClellan stated that "enactment of the
FEDC, if it ever attempted to break down the segregation laws of the country,
would be a greater step toward incitement to crime in America than anything
else the Congress could do." Id.
54. 110 CONG. REC. at 14304.
55. 110 CONG. REC. at 14305. McClellan contended that "we have only to
look at the experience of those States which have enacted statutes containing
provisions similar to those in this act. Those States have no better race
relations. In fact, in many instances they have greater tensions and worse
race relations than do those States which have not legislated in this field. We
2006]
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segregation was natural, and therefore forced race-mixing would
have violent consequences. In opposing the Civil Rights Bill of
1959, Thurmond argued that "political demands for integration of
the races" would bring a "wave of terror, crime, and juvenile
delinquency." As proof for this claim, Thurmond pointed to "crime
after crime in integrated New York" and other "integrated sections
of the country."56
The logic here is striking: race-mixing produces crime, and
therefore judges who facilitate racial integration have unleashed a
coming crime wave. Mechanisms remain opaque. Black civil
rights could breed crime via several avenues: perhaps race-mixing
is dangerous because blacks are inherently criminal; perhaps
forced integration will prompt white backlash; perhaps the
philosophy of civil disobedience itself undercuts the power of law.
Perhaps ambiguous mechanisms sustained the illogical and
visceral power of the claim.
Immediately after the Supreme Court's 1954 Brown decision,
southern Democrats launched attacks on judges for lenience in the
arena of racial integration. Two conservative supporters of
sentencing reform, Senators McClellan and Thurmond, drew the
lines of the debate with three basic oppositions - the Constitution
versus civil rights propagandists, strict legal reasoning versus
ever-expansive sociological reasoning, and law-and-order with Jim
Crow versus crime and chaos with civil rights. In this racialized
rhetoric of good versus evil, judges choose the wrong side of the
equation.
B. The Legacy of Attacking (Racially) Lenient Judges
As the Supreme Court issued more controversial decisions
through the 1950s and 1960s, early criticisms of racially lenient
judges gained prominence even as their racial specificity became
more subtle. Rhetorical attacks on judges as lenient, elitist, and
supportive of subversive elements remained stable as the issue at
hand slipped from allegedly pro-integration decisions, to allegedly
pro-Communist decisions, to allegedly pro-criminal decisions.
read daily of racial strife, of demonstrations, of aggravated assaults, of
murders, and of all manner of crime being committed in those States having
so-called civil rights laws." Id.
56. 105 CONG. REC. 18382, 18385 (1959).
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Southern Democrats attacked the Supreme Court early, often,
and fiercely after Brown, but Republicans joined in the attack as
the Supreme Court issued decisions that were widely interpreted
as pro-Communist and pro-criminal.57 In 1957, the Warren Court
handed down a series of decisions that ultimately protected the
procedural rights of Communists and persons suspected of being
Communist. The day in 1957 that the Court handed down its
decisions in Watkins, Yates, Sweezy and Service was known to
many Republicans and southern Democrats as "Red Monday," due
to the characterization by critics that the decisions represented
the Court's defense of Communist conspirators. 58
Between 1957 and 1966, the Supreme Court's "pro-criminal
decisions" expanded the rights of prisoners, criminal defendants,
and criminal suspects, many of whom were poor and black, some
of whom had confessed guilt.59 In Mallory v. United States, the
Supreme Court unanimously voided a District of Columbia rape
conviction.60 Violation of procedure was at the heart of the
decision: the Warren Court found that the police violated the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by failing to arraign the
defendant before questioning him for seven hours, subjecting him
to a lie-detector test, and recording his confession for conviction. 61
In a sense, the case pitted the value of procedural justice
(following the process) against the value of substantive justice
(convicting the guilty), and the Supreme Court upheld procedural
justice, declared the rape confession inadmissible, and thereby
voided the conviction - and for a black man no less! After
Mallory, Thurmond declared that the Court "has now issued an
edict which will give greater protection to such heinous criminals
57. C. HERMAN PRITCHETr, CONGRESS VERSUS THE SUPREME COURT, 1957-
1960 126-27 (1961); LYTLE, supra note 38, at 6-7, 29.
58. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 204-06, 215 (1957) (limited
the power of the House of Un-American Activities Committee); Yates v.
United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312 (1957) (decriminalized communist
organizing); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 253-55 (1957)
(invalidated state order that required a professor to disclose the nature of his
past expressions and associations); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 388-89
(1957) (guaranteed those under investigation for loyalty and standing the
right to a review with evidence and an independent determination).
59. THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL AND MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE
IMPACT OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS 110 (1992).
60. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 455-56 (1956).
61. Id.; LYTLE, supra note 38, at 43.
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as rapists and murderers."62
After Mallory, the Supreme Court extended procedural
protections for all kinds of politically dangerous groups such as
drug addicts, poor criminal defendants, and criminal suspects. In
Trop v. Dulles, the Supreme Court held that "cruel and unusual
punishment" is determined by the "evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society."63 In Robinson v.
California, the Supreme Court held that imprisonment for drug
addiction was "cruel and unusual punishment" because drug
addiction warrants treatment rather than punishment in the form
of incarceration.64 In Gideon v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court
held that poor state defendants were entitled to state-provided
legal counsel for all felony offenses. 65 In Escobedo v. Illinois, the
Supreme Court held that police must inform suspects of the right
to remain silent and the right to consult an attorney before
answering questions. 66 The Supreme Court reaffirmed the rights
of the accused in Miranda v. Arizona, which provided guidelines
for carrying out Escobedo.67
These Supreme Court decisions were widely viewed as judicial
assaults on crime control, and members of Congress mobilized a
kind of counterassault against judges. 68 After "Black Monday,"
"Red Monday," and Mallory and its "pro-criminal" progeny,
members of Congress introduced bills to gut the impact of recent
decisions, to tighten judicial jurisdiction, and to raise judicial
qualifications. In terms of gutting recent decisions, there were
fifty-five bills introduced between 1954 and 1961 to slow the
desegregation process, and all but two bills were introduced by
southern members of Congress; not one of these bills was enacted
into law. In terms of tightening jurisdiction, there were
approximately two hundred bills introduced between 1954 and
1961 to reform the judicial process, particularly by limiting
judicial appellate jurisdiction, and more than 150 bills were
introduced by southern members of Congress. 69 In terms of
62. 103 CONG. REC. at 10471.
63. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958).
64. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962).
65. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
66. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964).
67. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966).
68. EDSALL AND EDSALL, supra note 59, at 111.
69. PRITCHETT, supra note 57, at 26-27; LYTLE, supra note 38, at 11.
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judicial qualifications, there were fifty-four bills introduced
between 1954 and 1961 to tighten qualifications, with fifty-one
bills introduced by southern members of Congress. Qualification
bills attempted to require all future appointees to the Supreme
Court to have at least five years judicial experience in a lower
federal court or in the highest tribunal of the states; both
qualifications would make the pool of potential appointees more
likely to be politically and socially conservative.70
By the time Congress gave its final roll-call votes on the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, the narratives of discontent about
judicial discretion had been in place for three decades, beginning
sharply with southern Democrats' criticism of Brown v. Board of
Education in 1954 and gaining momentum after seemingly pro-
Communist and pro-criminal Supreme Court decisions. Criticisms
of judges in the 1950s and 1960s informed the criticisms that
continued through the 1970s and 1980s. Recall the three
arguments launched against judges after Brown: judges abuse
their power, judges worship sociological evidence, and judges
disregard the beneficial constraints of Jim Crow. These
arguments, issued first in debates over racial integration in the
context of low crime rates, had lasting power three decades later
in debates over sentencing reform and crime control. Some
supporters of Sentencing Guidelines emphasized a fairness
rationale, such as northern Democrat Senator Kennedy. But
other supporters of Sentencing Guidelines revealed a far more
complex rationale, such as southern Democrat Senator McClellan
and Republican Senator Thurmond.
The first Brown-inspired charge - judges abuse power -
retained its accusatory power throughout the second half of the
twentieth century, moving from the arena of black civil rights in
the 1950s to the arena of crime and sentencing policy in the 1960s
and beyond. Recall that in the mid-1950s southern Democrats
interpreted integration as a battle between the Constitution and
civil rights propagandists, and, so the political story goes, judges
sided with civil rights bullies. A decade later, Republicans courted
resentful white voters, particularly white southern Democrats, by
interpreting law-and-order as a battle between police and
criminals, and, so the political story goes, judges sided with
70. LYTLE, supra note 38, at 18.
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criminal rights bullies. In the rhetoric of southern Democrats and
Republicans, the charge of judicial misuse of power transmogrified
from "judges wrongly empower black civil rights" to "judges
wrongly empower (black) criminal rights." For example, in his
1968 Republican presidential campaign, Richard Nixon urged
"respect" for "courts and those who serve on them," only then to
warn that "some of our courts in their decisions have gone too far
in weakening the peace forces as against the criminal forces in
this country."71 In line with this attack on liberal judges, Nixon
endorsed limiting judicial discretion with "modernization" of the
federal criminal code, the policy precursor to the Sentencing
Guidelines. In his 1973 State of the Union Address, Nixon
advocated "modernizing" the "inadequate, clumsy, and outmoded"
federal criminal code. He added a punitive punch: "When I say
'modernize,' incidentally, I do not mean to be soft on crime; I mean
exactly the opposite. Our new code will give us tougher penalties
and stronger weapons in the war against dangerous drugs and
organized crime."72  That is, "modernization" entails both
rationalizing the criminal code and disciplining the liberal judge.
In partisan rhetoric, the Warren Court's allegedly soft-on-race
and soft-on-crime decisions were seen as the progeny of the
Democratic Party, and Democrats struggled with the image that
their crime policies were dictated by liberal legal experts, Ivy
League-educated judges, and the American Civil Liberties Union.
When Charles Schumer (D-New York) was first elected to the
House in 1980, he explained crime's role in the Reagan
Revolution: "I didn't understand why Reagan won until I got to
Washington. Crime was ripping apart my district. And who is
writing the crime legislation? The A.C.L.U. They weren't just at
the tale; they were writing it." 73
During final debates over the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,
supporters of Sentencing Guidelines trumpeted judicial
incompetence as a truism. Mistrust of judges took different forms:
the mild mistrust of liberal Democrats indicted judges for
71. Richard Nixon, Nomination Acceptance Address (Aug. 8, 1968).
72. Radio Address About the State of the Union Message on Law
Enforcement and Drug Abuse Prevention, 74 PUB. PAPERS 180 (March 10,
1973).
73. James Traub, Party Like It's 1994, THE N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE 44
(March 12, 2006).
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coordination difficulties resulted in disparities, while the more
vitriolic mistrust of Republicans and conservative Democrats
indicted judges for liberal elitism that results in lenience. As a
classic example of mild mistrust, Senator Edward Kennedy
suggested, "with all due respect.. .judges themselves have not been
willing to face this issue and ... remedy this situation."74 Vitriolic
mistrust, however, categorized judicial misuse of power as a
problem of arrogance. A Reagan Administration official endorsed
Guidelines by emphasizing that judges are out of touch with
homespun common sense, explaining that "[t]he judge, while
trained in the law, has no special competence in imposing a
sentence that will reflect society's values."75
The second Brown-inspired charge - judges worship
sociological evidence - carried a central epistemological criticism
that remained prominent through the sentencing revolution.
Recall that in the mid-1950s southern Democrats chastised judges
for forsaking narrow legal reasoning in favor of expansive
sociological reasoning. Sociological reasoning, as employed by
judges and others, became stigmatized in both civil rights policy
and in crime policy as a marker of lenient structural explanations.
As Stuart Scheingold elaborates, crime is generally explained by
either structural or volitional accounts. Structural explanations,
Scheingold states, attribute crime to "social disorganization with
its roots in hierarchy, deprivation, coercion, and alienation."
Taking society as the unit of analysis, structural explanations
take aim at the prevailing economic order and other kinds of
marginalization, and therefore structural crime control is "a
matter of formulating redistributive economic policies and
generating consent for them."76  In contrast, volitional
explanations attribute crime to "individual pathologies - be they
moral, emotional, or genetic." Taking the individual as the unit of
analysis, volitional explanations take aim at the offender,
generally suggesting punishment of the defective person.
According to Scheingold, political discourse tends to favor
volitional criminology, because punishment of the individual is
"easy, reassuring, and morally satisfying," even if it is not the
74. 130 CONG. REC. at 975; STITH AND CABRANES, supra note 15, at 44.
75. STITH AND CABRANES, supra note 15, at 44.
76. STUART SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF STREET CRIME 23 (1991).
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most effective policy in the long-run. Scheingold calls this political
preference for volitional accounts "the myth of crime and
punishment," in which the immediate satisfaction of punishing
the individual trumps the glacial and elusive goal of creating
social justice through structural reform. 77
In line with Scheingold's analysis, southern Democrats and
Republicans from the 1960s onward cast their pro-punitive policy
agenda as a much-needed turn away from sociological theory that
attributes crime to structural forces like poverty and racism.
House Leader Gerald Ford (R-Michigan) asked in 1966, "How long
are we going to abdicate law-and-order - the backbone of any
civilization - in favor of a soft social theory that the man who
heaves a brick through your window is simply the misunderstood
and underprivileged product of a broken home?"78 Presidential
candidate George Wallace similarly questioned how judges rely on
psychology in this exaggerated scenario: "If a criminal knocks you
over the head on your way home from work, he will be out of jail
before you're out of the hospital and the policeman who arrested
him will be on trial. But some psychologist will say, well, he's not
to blame, society is to blame." 79 Just as judges of the 1950s
exploited sociological accounts to show lenience toward blacks, the
argument goes, so too judges and liberal Democrats of the 1960s
and later exploited sociological accounts to show lenience toward
criminals.
The third post-Brown charge - judges generate crime by
loosening the beneficial constraints of Jim Crow - holds a subtle
and complex connection to sentencing and crime policy. In
overarching terms, the second half of the twentieth century well
illustrates the pivotal role of crime policy in the unsteady march of
racial equality. With Brown in 1954, the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, national leaders confronted
legal barriers to black political citizenship, and the years that
followed saw waning support for overt doctrines of white
superiority.8 0 During this same period of celebrated progress
toward racial equality, the racial composition of prisons fully
77. Id. at 4-7.
78. EDSALL AND EDSALL, supra note 59, at 51.
79. KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAw AND ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICs 34 (1997).
80. JOHN SKRENTNY, THE MINORITY RIGHTS REVOLUTION 65 (2002).
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reversed, with prisons turning from seventy percent white in 1950
to seventy percent black and Latino in 2000.81 Racialized
punishment expansion affects black communities with staggering
magnitude. Since 1995, roughly one in three black men between
the ages of twenty and twenty-nine are under some form of
criminal supervision on any given day.8 2  Through felon
disfranchisement laws, an estimated thirteen percent of all
African American men cannot vote.8 3 Since 2000 more black men
are in jail and prison than are in higher education, and between
1980 and 2000 three times as many African American men were
added to the prison system than were added to colleges and
universities nationwide.8 4 Black women face similar racial
disparity by sex: African American women have incarceration
rates six to seven times those of white women, a ratio roughly
equal to the disparity between African American and white men.8 5
This massive demographic rupture manifests more than the
end of rehabilitation in the history of ideals; in real terms, the
ever-expansive criminal justice state manifests another weapon in
the history of racial power. The fall of racially explicit exclusions
restructured national politics to give rise to race-laden crime
policy. Political attacks on judicial lenience - alongside a more
punitive electorate and the Democratic Party's abandonment of
both black civil rights and progressive crime policy - constitute a
thread that ties together anti-black segregationism in the 1950s to
anti-black punitiveness in the present.
III. CONCLUSION
When the Supreme Court's 2005 Booker decision ended
mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Justice Stephen
81. Loic Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis, Rethinking Race and
Imprisonment in Twenty-First Century America, 27 BOSTON REV. 23, 23
(2002).
82. MARC MAUER & TRACY HULING, YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS AND THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: FIvE YEARS LATER (1995); PAIGE M. HARRISON &
ALLEN BECK, PRISONERS IN 2002, T. 13 (2003).
83. JAMIE FELLNER AND MARC MAUER, LOSING THE VOTE: THE IMPACT OF
FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES (1998).
84. JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE, CELLBLOCKS OR CLASSROOMS? THE
FUNDING OF HIGHER EDUCATION AND CORRECTIONS AND ITS IMPACT ON AFRICAN
AMERICAN MEN (2002).
85. Id.
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Breyer addressed the fate of criminal sentencing by writing:
"Ours, of course, is not the last word. The ball now lies in
Congress' court. The national legislature is equipped to devise
and install, long-term, the sentencing system compatible with the
Constitution, that Congress judges best for the federal system of
justice." 6 This article contends that, if the sentencing revolution
is a game between Congress and federal judges, then Congress
has controlled the ball for at least the last third of the twentieth
century. After the Supreme Court's 1954 Brown decision ended
the separate-but-equal doctrine, southern Democrats and the
future conservative advocates of Sentencing Guidelines began
censuring judges for playing fast and loose with the racial order of
Jim Crow. Accusations of judicial lenience in racial control came
as a trio of criticisms, namely that judges abuse their power,
judges misuse sociological evidence, and judges enable crime
through civil rights liberalization.
Attacks on the racially liberal judge set in the 1950s retained
prominence through the sentencing revolution, and the rhetoric
against judicial lenience shifted from lenience with blacks to
lenience with criminals. By the time Congress mandated creation
of Sentencing Guidelines in 1984, attacks on the racially liberal
judge had gained even more credibility with Warren Court
decisions that were widely perceived as pro-black, pro-Communist,
and pro-criminal. It is commonly noted that Federal Sentencing
Guidelines garnered support from liberals like Senator Kennedy
as well as conservatives like Senators McClellan and Thurmond,
but this article does more than show how liberals wanted
rationalized moderate sentences while conservatives wanted
rationalized harsh sentences. Instead, this article suggests that
support for Sentencing Guidelines goes deeper than preferences
on sentencing; that is, there is a deeper and decidedly racial
legacy to attacking judicial discretion. In attacks on liberal judges
from Brown to Booker, Congress has judged the judges for
transgressing racial guidelines.
86. John Gibeaut, All Sides Wary of Sentencing Ruling: Changes in Store
as Supreme Court Revokes Mandatory Guidelines, ABA JOURNAL E-REPORT,
Jan. 14, 2005.
